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Introduction
3 March 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall approached the chambers of the Supreme
Court to deliver the opinion in the case of Worcester v. Georgia (Worcester). Samuel A.
Worcester, missionary and supporter of Cherokee independence, had been arrested and
sentenced in 1831 to hard labor for his presence in Cherokee territory “without a license or
permit from the Governor of the State, or from anyone authorized to grant it, and without having
taken the oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia, and
uprightly to demean himself as a citizen thereof, contrary to the laws of the said State.” 1 While
the seventy-six year old Chief Justice’s decision promised a definitive conclusion to the
incarceration of Worcester, it was suggested that Marshall’s opinion signaled a defeat for the
“deep laid scheme of cruelty and usurpation” perpetrated on the Cherokee people. 2
As Marshall got to his place he furtively glanced around the chambers, took his chair, and
proceeded to deliver his opinion. “The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in
error was prosecuted,” Marshall stated, “is consequently void, and the judgment is nullity.” To
be sure, Worcester’s incarceration was terminated but Georgia’s “usurpation” of Cherokee
territorial control was determined to be unconstitutional. Furthermore, Marshall determined the
Georgia statute unconstitutional because it “interfere[s] forcibly with the relations established
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the regulation of which, according to the
settled principles of our Constitution, is committed exclusively to the Government of the
Union.” 3
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A

Reversal of Opinion

Marshall’s legal holding in Worcester however, was markedly different than the opinion
he gave less than a year prior in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (Cherokee Nation). In December
1828, the Georgia legislature enacted a bill that placed legal and political restrictions on
Cherokee peoples and reversed their political autonomy within the state. The 1828 and
consecutive 1829 bill “add[ed] the territory lying within the chartered limits of Georgia, now in
the occupancy of the Cherokee Indians, to the counties of Carroll, De Kalb, Gwinett, Hall, and
Habersham, …extend[ed] the laws of this State over the same, …annul[led] all laws and
ordinances made by the Cherokee Nation of Indians, …and regulate[d] the testimony of
Indians.” On March 5, 1831, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the suit brought by the
Cherokee Nation which argued Cherokees were “a foreign state, not owing allegiance to the
United States, nor to any State of this Union” and that the Cherokee were “a sovereign and
independent state.” 4
While Marshall upheld Union exclusivity in relations with the Cherokee in Worcester, in
Cherokee Nation he tacitly ruled in favor of Georgia and, consequently, states’ rights through his
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Marshall believed that the Cherokee Nation was not a
“foreign state” as was outlined in the Constitution. Rather, the relationship between the Cherokee
Nation and the United States was more like that of “a ward to his guardian.” Continually,
Marshall was more deferential to states rights throughout the remainder of the opinion. Marshall,
feeling that the “propriety” of judicial restraint and “interposition by the Court” on the
“Legislature of Georgia” would be “well…questioned,” believed that overturning the Georgia
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statute “savours to [sic] much…political power” for the Judicial Department. 5 Yet, less than a
year transpired between Cherokee Nation and Worcester and Worcester was an unambiguous
support of Federalism, Congressional and Constitutional supremacy in a political environment
where growing sectionalism and concerns of state sovereignty were the issues de jure. What
accounts for Marshall’s reversal of opinion between Cherokee Nation and Worcester? I suggest
that Worcester was seen by individuals in the North as a case regarding nullification “by some
other name” because of interconnections drawn by southern critics upon the Tariff Bill,
Cherokee Removal, and federal infractions on state sovereignty. 6 Moreover, I argue that
Marshall’s opinion in Worcester was judicial commentary on the the escalating 1830s
Nullification Crisis sparked by South Carolina’s protests and threats of nullification over the
Tariffs of 1828 and 1832—South Carolinians termed them the Tariff of Abominations—that
used Georgia’s Cherokee statutes and the subsequent case as the framework to assert federal
supremacy. In short, Marshall’s “ardent [and] unbending” 7 Federalism prevented him from idly
allowing an “idea…so repugnant to the existence of Union” to gain prominence without
commentary. 8

South Carolina and Georgia: The Language of Nullification
South Carolina and Georgia saw the 1828 Tariff Bill in sectional terms. After the passage
of the 1828 Tariff Bill, South Carolina immediately began to hold public protests that sought
repeal and instructed participants to “resist the impositions of this tariff.” Georgia, in an
expression of solidarity, held protests “demanding the repeal of an act, which has already
5
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disturbed the union, endangered the public tranquility, [and] weakened the confidence of whole
states in the federal government.” 9 For South Carolina and Georgia, their fears rested in the
belief that the 1828 Tariff Bill’s goal was to unfairly place the industrial North in a stronger,
comparative position to the agricultural South. “Ruinous to commerce and agriculture,” stated
one Georgia newspaper, the Tariff Bill’s purpose was “to secure a hateful monopoly to a
combination of importunate manufacturers.” As manufacturing in the 1830s was mostly
concentrated in the fledgling industrial centers of the Northeast, Southern concerns expressed not
just trepidation of a “hateful” manufacturing monopoly but a “hateful” and “importunate”
monopoly vested in Northern interests. 10
Additionally, South Carolina and Georgia connected the protestation of, and resistance to,
the Tariff Bill to that of sovereignty. Specifically, the tariff bill encroached upon state control of
commerce control, but it was broadly defined as a federal usurpation of state sovereignty. For
example, a South Carolina Anti-Tariff Meeting adamantly claimed that the passage of the
“oppressive” tariff was a direct “violation of our sovereign rights.” Moreover, politicians in
Georgia, fearing the potential for Georgia to “become a tariff state,” formally protested the tariff
with a resolution sent to the U.S. Senate for archival purposes if continued perversion of power
“should render necessary, measures of decisive character, for the protection of the people of the
state [Georgia].” In short, continued oppressive federal interjection upon state sovereignty would
legitimize “measures of decisive character” to protect it and provide for the “vindication of the
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constitution of the United States.” As the 1820s gave way to the 1830s, though, Georgians began
to forge connections between an internal territorial issue and state sovereignty. 11

Cherokee Removal: Georgia’s Tariff Bill
Georgia, mirroring the same sovereignty arguments as South Carolina against the Tariff
Bill, began to shift focus to the territorial issue of Cherokee Removal. On 28 May, 1830, in an
effort to ease growing territory disputes and land scarcity, President Andrew Jackson signed the
Indian Removal Act. However, unsure if the federal government was going to “carry the
provisions” of the 1830s Indian Removal Act “into effect,” Georgia choose to “act on her own
responsibility.” A 1830s editorial in the Georgia Journal challenged Georgians to “determine
whether she will relinquish her claim to the territory forever, or whether she will assert her
rights.” Additionally, Georgians, like their South Carolinian counterparts, were encouraged to
openly defy and resist laws that were considered inflammatory to the state. Later, the same 1830s
editorial resolutely instructed its readers “to defy the threats of hypocritical and jesuitical [sic]
enemies.” 12 Continually, territorial disputes between Georgia, the federal government, and the
Cherokee Nation began to be framed in stronger sovereignty language. As it became apparent
that the conviction of Samuel Worcester might receive a review before the Supreme Court,
Georgia’s governor, Wilson Lumpkin, made allusions to tariff sovereignty arguments, potential
“measures of decisive character,” and nullification. “Any attempt to infringe the evident right of
a State,” declared Lumpkin:
to govern the entire population within its territorial limits, and to punish all offences
committed against its laws, within those limits…would be the usurpation of a power
never granted by the States. Such an attempt, whenever made, will challenge the most
11
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determined resistance; and if persevered in, will inevitably eventuate in the annihilation
of our beloved Union.
For Lumpkin, the federal “usurpation” of Georgia’s sovereignty in dealings with the Cherokee
Nation within its territorial boundaries was an offense that warranted inevitable nullification. 13
To be sure, even though Georgian arguments and language mirrored the arguments and
language of South Carolina’s nullification campaign, Georgians still maintained that they were
not supporters of nullification; rather, they were vehement proponents of state sovereignty. In an
effort to solidify this dichotomy, Georgians routinely identified individuals with the “taint of
nullification,” clearly stated that they were “clear against being tricked into his [John C.
Calhoun] support,” and unambiguously stated that Georgia does “not approve of the doctrine of
Nullification.” 14 However, the press campaign to establish an unequivocal separation between
South Carolinian “nullifiers” and Georgian sovereignty supporters was derailed by attempts to
construct stronger connections between the states. An 1831 editorial in the Georgia Journal
suggested that “there is no good reason” for sister states who shared “past toils, past triumphs,
and present sufferings” to be divided on the “principle” issue of nullification. For Georgians, the
“present sufferings” of their home state and South Carolina as a result of federal infringement
should unite them in “a peaceable and constitutional remedy.” 15
Northern perceptions and those outside of Georgia and South Carolina focused on
language and action to draw comparisons between South Carolina nullification and identified
many Georgians as “de facto Nullifiers.” Many pointed to the fact that Georgia had declared an
act of Congress unconstitutional and was, consequently, null and void as literal evidence to
accuse Georgia of being nullifiers. Moreover, some believed that the only actual “difference
13
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between them [Georgia and South Carolina] was little more than verbal, and that the operations
of both is the same.” 16 Surpassing the concerns of literal action, others analogized nullification
and Indian removal to the destruction of the Union. “The extinguishment of Indian rights,”
opined an editorial in the religious journal, The Friend, “…will extend far, and cut the vitals of
these United States. It is a twin brother to nullification, which has reared its head, and spoken the
discordant sentiments of disunion in South Carolina.” 17 While Georgia carefully constructed its
language to avoid the terminology of nullification, many came to understand that “they practice
the thing itself, in their own State, but call it by some other name.” 18

Worcester and Marshall: A Commentary on Nullification
In Worcester, Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with a paragon legal case of
emerging sectionalism and a challenge of federal power. Marshall, his fellow jurists, and the
entirety of fledging Union were awash in sea of arguments, perspectives, and press. Since the
passage of the Tariff of 1828, South Carolina had embarked on a campaign of undermining
federal power and calling for the repeal of the Tariff upon sovereignty grounds. Georgia joined
the protest and mirrored South Carolina’s sovereignty arguments and clamor for repeal.
However, Georgia, dealing with land pressures, decided to shift focus to Indian removal and
framed the issue in sovereignty terms. After a series of laws that removed Cherokee
independence and self-governance, they passed a law which required permits for white
individuals to be present in Cherokee territory. When the Supreme Court chose to hear the case
of Worcester, Georgia’s governor, Wilson Lumpkin, had a “earnest hope,” if not an expectation
based on the previous case of Cherokee Nation, that the court would not overturn the conviction
16
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and by extension Georgia’s usurpation of federal control of tribal governance. 19 Marshall, seeing
error in Cherokee and sympathizing with “the cause of these oppressed people,” did not realize
Lumpkin’s “earnest hope.” Yet, there was more to Marshall’s opinion in Worcester; it was a case
before the Supreme Court that would provide a vehicle for judicial commentary of the
nullification crisis. 20
The public discourse had already intimately connected nullification, Indian removal, and,
by extension, Worcester. While nullification and Indian removal were explicitly connected as
“brothers” in the 1830s press, the language of sovereignty, the actions of resistance and the
voiding of federal statutes, and camaraderie shared in the face of federal oppression were
exhaustively recycled to connect South Carolina and Georgia. To what extent John Marshall was
aware of the public discourse is speculative at best, however, Marshall did connect Georgia and
South Carolina with nullification and Indian removal through his opinion in Worcester.
Nullification was an issue present in Marshall’s personal correspondence. In a letter to Edward
Everett, a prominent figure in anti-nullification, in November 1830, Marshall declared that “the
idea that a state may constitutionally nullify an act of Congress is so extravagant…and so
repugnant to the existence of Union.” 21 Continually, in correspondence with John Quincy Adams
both men came to agree that, indeed, “no state can by virtue of her Sovereignty nullify any Act
of Congress.” 22 By the time the court heard arguments in Worcester, the nullification crisis was
the penultimate political issue. Marshall reversed the lower court’s ruling, freed Worcester, and
made a stinging indictment towards Georgia’s action. “The acts of Georgia,” declared Marshall,
19
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“are repugnant to the constitution, laws and treaties of The United States.” Moreover, Georgia
“forcibly” interfered with “relations…committed exclusively to the government of the union.”
Marshall’s opinion linguistically interconnected nullification and Worcester. For Marshall, both
the acts of Georgia and “extravagant” nullification were “repugnant” to the Constitution and
Union. But, this shared repugnancy was centered in the usage of the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ in
the usurpation of federal exclusivity. While South Carolina cited “sovereignty” in Tariff protest,
many anti-nullification arguments centered on the constitutional fact that Congress—i.e. federal
government—had constitutional exclusivity to regulate inter-state and foreign commerce. In
Worcester, Marshall was asserting the federal exclusivity/supremacy of Union control in Indian
relations and, by extension, federal exclusivity in regulating foreign trade. 23
Unambiguously, Marshall was critical of the “doctrine of sovereignty” and nullification.
Marshall traced the danger of nullification to its theoretical foundation of unassailable state
sovereignty. For Marshall, “the independence of the states” existed as a “graft on the stock of the
union of the states” and these two closely connected items “exist, flourish, and must perish
together.” Moreover, the fact that radical “extravagancies of the day, including nullification,”
used the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ as their “root” for justification consequently put the entire
system in turmoil. Ironically, as Marshall explained, because the “Nullifiers” used sovereignty
and state independence arguments to legitimize nullification, the actual nullification of the Union
itself would weaken, if not completely undermine, the independence of the states as sovereignty
and the Union “perish together.” 24
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Conclusion
Marshall could not have anticipated the maelstrom of discontent that arose from his
opinion in Worcester. After the decision, commentators ironically noted that Georgia’s “denial of
the paramount authority of the Supreme Court savours amazingly of Nullification” 25 and Wilson
Lumpkin vowed, in regards to “unconstitutional encroachment of the federal judiciary,” “to
meet this usurpation of federal power, with the most prompt and determined resistance.” 26 The
public discourse had interconnected South Carolina and Georgia with Georgia and Indian
removal. South Carolinians and Georgians attempted to unify around a common philosophy of
sovereignty and shared experiences of federal oppression. Anti-nullification commentators in the
North used similarity of action—acts of resistance to Congressional / Constitutional mandates—
to drawn connections between South Carolina and Georgia and eventually labeled Indian
removal as the “twin brother” of nullification. Marshall’s judicial propriety disallowed his
participation in press propaganda, but personal correspondence reveals a personal and political
aversion to the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ and nullification. Marshall’s language in Worcester,
mirrored concerns of nullification present in personal correspondence through an identified
shared repugnancy to the “existence of Union” and “constitution.”
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